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1When Does Learning in Games
Generate Convergence to Nash Equilibria?
The Role of Supermodularity in an Experimental Setting
Abstract
This study clariﬁes the conditions under which learning in games produces convergence to Nash equi-
libria in practice. Previous work has identiﬁed theoretical conditions under which various stylized learning
processes achieve convergence. One technical condition is supermodularity, which is closely related to
the more familiar concept of strategic complementarities. We experimentally investigate the role of super-
modularity in achieving convergence through learning. Using a game from the literature on solutions to
externalities, we systematically vary a free parameter below, close to, at and beyond the threshold of super-
modularity to assess its effects on convergence. We ﬁnd that supermodular and “near-supermodular” games
converge signiﬁcantly better than those far below the threshold. From a little below the threshold to the
threshold, the improvement is statistically insigniﬁcant. Within the class of supermodular games, increasing
the parameter far beyond the threshold does not signiﬁcantly improve convergence. Simulation shows that
while most experimental results persist in the long run, some become more pronounced.
Keywords: learning, supermodular games
JEL Classiﬁcation: C90; D70
21 Introduction
When do players learn to play Nash equilibria? The answer to this important question will help us identify
when the outcomes predicted by theory will be realized in competitive environments involving real people.
This question has been examined both theoretically (see Fudenberg and Levine (1998) for a survey) and
experimentally (see Camerer (2003) for a survey).
According to the theoretical literature, games with strategic complementarities (Milgrom and Roberts
1991, Milgrom and Shannon 1994) have robust dynamic stability properties: under numerous learning dy-
namics, they converge to the set of Nash equilibria that bound the serially-undominated set. The learning
dynamics include Bayesian learning, ﬁctitious play, adaptive learning, Cournot best reply and many oth-
ers. These games include the supermodular games of Topkis (1979), Vives (1985, 1990), Cooper and John
(1988), and Milgrom and Roberts (1990). In supermodular games, each player’s marginal utility of increas-
ing her strategy rises with increases in her rival’s strategies, so that (roughly) the players’ strategies are
“strategic complements.”
Existing literature recognizes that games with strategic complementarities encompass important eco-
nomic applications of noncooperative game theory, for example, macroeconomics under imperfect compe-
tition (Cooper and John 1988), search (Diamond 1982), bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig 1983, Postlewaite
and Vives 1987), network and adoption externalities (Dybvig and Spatt 1983), and mechanism design (Chen
2002).
Past experimental studies of learning and mechanism design suggest that, in addition to equilibrium
efﬁciency, mechanism choice should depend on whether players learn to play the equilibrium and the na-
ture of play on the path to equilibrium. In reviewing the experimental literature on incentive-compatible
mechanisms for pure public goods, Chen (forthcoming) ﬁnds that mechanisms with strategic complemen-
tarities, such as the Groves-Ledyard mechanism under a high punishment parameter, converge robustly to
the efﬁcient equilibrium (Chen and Plott 1996, Chen and Tang 1998). Conversely, those far away from
the threshold of strategic complementarities do not seem to converge (Smith 1979, Harstad and Marrese
1982). In previous experiments, parameters are set either far away from the threshold for strategic com-
plementarities (e.g., Chen and Tang (1998)) or very close to the threshold (e.g., Falkinger, Fehr, G¨ achter
and Winter-Ebmer (2000)).1 However, these experiments do not systematically set the parameters below,
close to, at and above the threshold to assess the effect of strategic complementarities on convergence. This
is the ﬁrst such systematic experimental study of games with strategic complementarities.2 Consequently,
1Proofs of supermodularity of the Groves-Ledyard and the Falkinger mechanisms are presented in Chen (1997).
2By systematically varying the free parameter in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism, Arifovic and Ledyard (2001) study learning
3this study answers three important questions that the theory on games with strategic complementarities does
not address. First, as the parameters approach the threshold of strategic complementarities, will play con-
verge to equilibrium gradually or abruptly? Second, is there a clear performance ranking among games
with strategic complementarities? Third, how important is strategic complementarity compared to other
factors? The answer to the ﬁrst question can help us assess, a priori, whether a game “close” to being super-
modular, such as the Falkinger mechanism (Falkinger 1996), might also have good convergence properties.
The answer to the second question will help us choose the best parameters within the class of games with
strategic complementarities. The answer to the third question will help us assess the importance of strategic
complementarities in learning and convergence.
To address these questions, this study adopts an experimental game from the literature on solutions to ex-
ternalities. Varian (1994) proposes a simple class of two-stage mechanisms, the compensation mechanisms,
whose subgame-perfect equilibria implement efﬁcient allocations. In a generalized version of Varian’s
mechanism (Cheng 1998), one can vary, without altering the equilibrium, a parameter which determines
whether the condition for strategic complementarities is satisﬁed.
There have been two experimental studies of the compensation mechanisms, neither of which adopts a
version with strategic complementarities. Andreoni and Varian (1999) study the mechanism in the context of
thePrisoners’Dilemma. TheyﬁndthataddingacommitmentstagetothestandardPrisoners’Dilemmagame
nearly doubles the amount of cooperation to two-thirds. Hamaguchi, Mitani and Saijo (2003) investigate a
version with a larger strategy space and ﬁnd 20% Nash equilibrium play.
In this paper, we examine the compensation mechanism in an economic environment with a much larger
strategy space. Furthermore, we choose various versions to study systematically the effect of strategic
complementarities on convergence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces games with strategic complemen-
tarities and presents theoretical properties of the compensation mechanisms. Section 3 presents the exper-
imental design. Section 4 introduces the set of hypotheses. Section 5 presents experimental results on the
level and speed of convergence, as well as efﬁciency. Section 6 presents the calibration of three learning
models, validation of the models on a hold-out sample, and simulation of performance in the long run using
a calibrated learning model. Section 7 discusses our ﬁndings. Section 8 concludes.
dynamics and mechanism convergence using genetic algorithms compared with experimental data.
42 Strategic Complementarity and the Compensation Mechanisms
Games with strategic complementarities (Milgrom and Shannon 1994) need an order structure on strategy
spaces (e.g., subsets of the real line), a weak continuity requirement on payoffs, and satisfaction of the
single-crossing property.3 These games include supermodular games, ﬁrst introduced by Topkis (1979), and
further studied by Vives (1985, 1990), Cooper and John (1988), and Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
Supermodular games are games in which the incremental return to any player from increasing her strat-
egy is a nondecreasing function of the strategy choices of other players (increasing differences). Further-
more, if a player’s strategy space has more than one dimension, components of a player’s strategy are
complements (supermodularity). Membership in this class of games is easy to check. Indeed, for smooth
functions in IRn, letting Pi be the strategy space and ¼i be the payoff function of player i, the following
theorem characterizes increasing differences and supermodularity.
THEOREM 1 (Topkis (1978)) Let ¼i be twice continuously differentiable on Pi. Then ¼i has increasing
differences in (pi;pj) if and only if @2¼i=@pih@pjl ¸ 0 for all i 6= j and all 1 · h · ki and all 1 · l · kj;
and ¼i is supermodular in pi if and only if @2¼i=@pih@pil ¸ 0 for all i and all 1 · h < l · ki;
Increasing differences means that an increase in the strategy of player i’s rivals raises her marginal
utility of playing a high strategy. The supermodularity requirement ensures complementarity among com-
ponents of a player’s strategies and is automatically satisﬁed in a one-dimensional strategy space. Note that
a supermodular game is a game with strategic complementarities, but the converse is not true.
Supermodular games have interesting theoretical properties. In particular, they are robustly stable. Mil-
grom and Roberts (1990) prove that, in these games, learning algorithms consistent with adaptive learning
converge to the set bounded by the largest and the smallest Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁles. Intuitively,
a sequence is consistent with adaptive learning if players “eventually abandon strategies that perform con-
sistently badly in the sense that there exists some other strategy that performs strictly and uniformly better
against every combination of what the competitors have played in the not too distant past” (Milgrom and
Roberts 1990). This includes numerous learning dynamics, such as Bayesian learning, ﬁctitious play, adap-
tive learning, Cournot best reply. While strategic complementarity is sufﬁcient for convergence, it is not
a necessary condition. Thus, while games with strategic complementarities ought to converge robustly to
the Nash equilibrium, games without strategic complementarities may also converge under speciﬁc learning
3Let P be the strategy space and ¼i be the payoff function of player i. For all z;y 2 P with z ¸ y, the following single-crossing
conditions hold: [¼i(zi;y¡i) ¸ ¼i(yi;y¡i)] ) [¼i(zi;z¡i) ¸ ¼i(yi;z¡i)] and [¼i(zi;y¡i) > ¼i(yi;y¡i)] ) [¼i(zi;z¡i) >
¼i(yi;z¡i)].
5algorithms. Whether these speciﬁc learning algorithms are a realistic description of human learning is an
empirical question.
While the theory on games with strategic complementarities predicts convergence to equilibrium, it
does not address four practical issues. First, as the parameters of a game approach the threshold of strategic
complementarities, does play converge gradually or abruptly? Second, is convergence faster further past the
threshold? Third, how important is strategic complementarity compared to other features of a game which
might also induce convergence to equilibrium? Last, for supermodular games with multiple Nash equilibria,
will players learn to coordinate on a particular equilibrium? We choose a game which allows us to answer
the ﬁrst three questions. The fourth question has been addressed by Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990)
and Cox and Walker (1998).4
Speciﬁcally, we use the compensation mechanism to study the role of strategic complementarities in
learning and convergence to equilibrium play. In the mechanism, each of two players offers to compensate
the other for the “costs” of the efﬁcient choice. Assume that when player 1’s production equals x, her net
proﬁt is rx ¡ c(x), where r is the market price and c(¢) is a differentiable, positive, increasing and convex
cost function. Production causes an externality on player 2, whose payoff is ¡e(x), also assumed to be
differentiable, positive, increasing and convex. The mechanism is a two-staged game where the unique
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium induces the Pareto efﬁcient outcome of x such that r = e0(x) + c0(x).
In the ﬁrst stage (the announcement stage), player 1 announces p1, a per unit subsidy to be paid to player
2, while player 2 simultaneously announces p2, a per unit tax to be paid by player 1. Announcements are
revealed to both players. In the second stage (the production stage), player 1 chooses a production level x.
The payoff to player 1 is ¼1 = rx¡c(x)¡p2x¡®(p1¡p2)2, while the payoff to player 2 is ¼2 = p1x¡e(x),
where ® > 0 is a free punishment parameter chosen by the designer.
Westudya generalizedversionofthecompensationmechanism(Cheng1998), whichaddsapunishment
term, ¡¯(p1 ¡ p2)2, to player 2’s payoff function, thus making the payoff functions:
¼1 = rx ¡ c(x) ¡ p2x ¡ ®(p1 ¡ p2)2;and ¼2 = p1x ¡ e(x) ¡ ¯(p1 ¡ p2)2: (1)
4Cox and Walker (1998) study whether subjects can learn to play Cournot duopoly strategies in games with two kinds of interior
Nash equilibrium. Their type I duopoly has a stable interior Nash equilibrium under Cournot best-reply dynamics and therefore is
dominance solvable (Moulin 1984). Their type II duopoly has an unstable interior Nash equilibrium and two boundary equilibria
under Cournot best-reply dynamics, and therefore is not dominance solvable. They found that after a few periods subjects did play
stable interior, dominance solvable equilibria, but they did not play the unstable interior equilibria nor the boundary equilibria.
It is interesting to note that these duopoly games are submodular games. Being two-player games, they are also supermodular
(Amir 1996). Results of Cox and Walker (1998) illustrate the importance of uniqueness together with supermodularity in inducing
convergence.
6Using the generalized version, we solve the game by backwards induction. In the production stage,
player 1 chooses the quantity that solves the following problem:
max
x rx ¡ c(x) ¡ p2x ¡ ®(p1 ¡ p2)2:
The ﬁrst order condition is
r ¡ c0(x) ¡ p2 = 0;
which characterizes the best response in the second stage, x(p2). In the announcement stage, player 1 solves
max
p1
rx ¡ c(x) ¡ p2x ¡ ®(p1 ¡ p2)2:
The ﬁrst order condition is
@¼1
@p1
= ¡2®(p1 ¡ p2) = 0; (2)
which yields the best response function for player 1 as p1 = p2. Player 2 simultaneously solves
max
p2
p1x(p2) ¡ e(x(p2)) ¡ ¯(p1 ¡ p2)2:
The ﬁrst order condition is
@¼2
@p2
= p1x0(p2) ¡ e0(x)x0(p2) + 2¯(p1 ¡ p2) = 0; (3)
which characterizes player 2’s best response function.
The unique subgame-perfect equilibrium has p1 = p2 = p¤, where p¤ is the Pigovian tax which induces
the efﬁcient quantity, x¤. As the equilibrium does not depend on the value of ¯, it holds for the original
version where ¯ = 0. However, when ¯ is set appropriately, the generalized version is a supermodular
mechanism. The following proposition characterizes the necessary and sufﬁcient condition for supermodu-
larity.
PROPOSITION 1 (Cheng (1998)) The generalized version of the compensation mechanism is supermod-




The proof is simple. First, as the strategy space is one-dimensional, the supermodularity condition
is automatically satisﬁed. Second, we use Theorem 1 to check for increasing differences. For player 1,
from Equation (2), we have @2¼1
@p1@p2 = 2® > 0, while for player 2, from Equation (3), we have @2¼2
@p1@p2 =
x0(p2) + 2¯. Therefore, @2¼2




To obtain analytical solutions, we use a quadratic cost functionc(x) = cx2, where c > 0, and a quadratic
externality function e(x) = ex2, where e > 0. We now summarize the best response functions, equilibrium
solutions and stability analysis in this environment.
7PROPOSITION 2 Quadratic cost and externality functions yield the following characterizations:
































3. If players follow Cournot best-reply dynamics, (p¤
1;p¤
2) is a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium
of the continuous time dynamical system for any ® > 0 and ¯ ¸ 0.
4. The game is supermodular if and only if ® > 0 and ¯ ¸ 1
4c.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The best-response functions presented in Part 1 of Proposition 2 reveal interesting incentives. While
player 1 has an incentive to always match player 2’s price, player 2 has an incentive to match only when
player 1 plays the equilibrium strategy. Also, at the threshold for strategic complementarity, ¯ = 1
4c, player
2 has a dominant strategy, p2 = er
e+c = p¤
2. Part 3 of Proposition 2 extends Cheng (1998), who shows that the
original version of the compensation mechanism (¯ = 0) is globally stable under continuous time Cournot
best-reply dynamics.5 However, Cournot best-reply is a relatively poor description of human learning, e.g.,
Boylan and El-Gamal (1993). Therefore, global stability under Cournot best reply for any ¯ ¸ 0 does
not imply equilibrium convergence among human subjects. Part 4 characterizes the threshold for strategic
complementarity in our experiment, a more robust stability criterion than that characterized by Part 3.
An intuition for how strategic complementarities affect the outcome of adaptive learning can be gained
from analysis of the best response functions, Equations (4) and (5). While player 1’s best response function
is always upward sloping, player 2’s best response function, Equation (5), is nondecreasing if and only if
¯ ¸ 1
4c, i.e., when the game is supermodular. Beyond the threshold for strategic complementarity, both best
response functions are upward sloping and they intersect at the equilibrium. It is easy to verify (graphically)
that adaptive learners, e.g., Cournot best reply, will converge to the equilibrium regardless of where they
start.
5Cheng (1998) also shows that the original mechanism is locally stable under discrete time Cournot best-reply dynamics.
8To examine how ®, which is unrelated to strategic complementarity, might affect behavior, we observe
that when player 1 deviates from the best response by ", i.e., p1 = p2 + ", his proﬁt loss is ∆¼1 = ¡®"2.
This proﬁt loss, which is proportional to the magnitude of ®, is the deviation cost for player 1. Based on
previous experimental evidence, the incentive to deviate from best response decreases when the deviation
cost increases. Chen and Plott (1996) call it the General Incentive Hypothesis, i.e., the error of game
theoretic models decreases as the level of incentive increases. We therefore expect that an increase in ®
improves player 1’s convergence to equilibrium. When player 1 plays equilibrium strategy, player 2’s best
response is to play equilibrium strategy as well. Therefore, we expect that an increase in ® might improve
player 2’s convergence to equilibrium as well. It is not clear, however, whether the ®-effects systematically
change the effects of the supermodularity parameter ¯. We rely on experimental data to test the interaction
of the ®-effects on ¯-effects.
3 Experimental Design
Our experimental design reﬂects both theoretical and technical considerations. Speciﬁcally, we chose an
environment that allows signiﬁcant latitude in varying the free parameters to better assess the performance
of the compensation mechanism around the threshold of strategic complementarity. We describe this envi-
ronment and the experimental procedures below.
3.1 The Economic Environment
We use the general payoff functions presented in Equation (1) with quadratic cost and externality functions
to obtain analytical solutions: c(x) = cx2 and e(x) = ex2. We use the following parameters: c = 1=80;e =
1=40;r = 24. From Proposition 2, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is (p¤
1;p¤
2;x¤) = (16;16;320)
and the threshold for strategic complementarity is ¯ = 1
4c = 20.
In the experiment, each player chooses pi 2 f0;1;¢¢¢;40g. Without the compensation mechanism,
the proﬁt-maximizing production level is x = 960, three times higher than the efﬁcient level. To reduce
the complexity of player 1’s problem, we use a grid size of 10 for the quantity and truncate the strategy
space, i.e., player 1 chooses X 2 f0;1;¢¢¢;50g, where X = x=10. The payoff functions presented to
the subjects are adjusted accordingly (see Appendix B). Truncating the strategy space to X · 50 also
reduces the possibility of player 2’s bankruptcy. To reduce payoff asymmetry, we give player 1 a lump sum
payment of 250 points each round. Therefore, the equilibrium payoffs for the two players are ¼1 = 1530
and ¼2 = 2560.
9The functional forms and speciﬁc parameter values are chosen for several reasons. First, equilibrium
solutions are integers. Second, equilibrium prices and quantities do not lie in the center of the strategy space,
thus avoiding equilibrium convergence as a result of focal points. Third, there is a salient gap between
efﬁciency with and without the mechanism. Without the mechanism, the proﬁt-maximizing production
level is X = 50, resulting in an efﬁciency level of 68.4%. With the mechanism, the system achieves 100%
efﬁciency in equilibrium. Finally, since the threshold for strategic complementarity is ¯ = 20, there are a
large number of ¯ values to choose from both below and above the threshold.
To study how strategic complementarity affects equilibrium convergence, we keep ® = 20, and vary
¯ = 0;18;20; and 40. To study whether ® affects convergence, we also keep ® = 10, and vary ¯ = 0;20.
3.2 Experimental Procedures
Our experiment involves 12 players per session — six player 1’s (called Red players in the instructions)
and six player 2’s (Blue players). Each player remains the same type throughout the experiment. At the
beginning of each session, subjects randomly draw a PC terminal number. Each then sits in front of the
corresponding terminal, and is given printed instructions. After the instructions are read aloud, subjects are
encouraged to ask questions. The instruction period varies between ﬁfteen to thirty minutes.
Each round a player 1 is randomly matched with a player 2. Subjects are randomly re-matched each
round to minimize repeated game effects. The random re-matching protocol also minimizes the possibility
that players collude on a high subsidy and low tax outcome.6 Each session consists of 60 rounds. As we are
interested in learning, there are no practice rounds. Each round consists of two stages:
1. AnnouncementStage: Eachplayersimultaneouslyandindependentlychoosesaprice,pi 2 f0;1;¢¢¢;40g.
2. Production Stage: After (p1;p2) are chosen, player 1’s computer displays player 2’s price and a payoff
tableshowingherpayoffforeachX 2 f0;1;¢¢¢;50g. Player1thenchoosesaquantity, X. Theserver
calculates payoffs and sends each player his payoff, the quantity chosen, and the prices submitted by
him and his match.
To summarize, each subject knows both payoff functions, the choices made each round by himself and
his match, as well as his per period and cumulative payoffs. At any point, subjects have ready access to all
of this information. The mechanism is thus implemented as a game of complete information. However, we








. With our choice of parameters, we get: p1 = 24;p2 = 12 for ® = 20
and ¯ = 0; p1 = 19:2;p2 = 14:4 for ® = 20 and ¯ = 20; and p1 = 18;p2 = 15 for ® = 20 and ¯ = 40; etc.
10do not know how subjects processed this information, nor do we know their beliefs about the rationality of
others. Both of these factors introduce uncertainty in the environment.
[Table 1 about here.]
Table 1 presents features of the experimental sessions, including parameters, number of independent
sessions in each treatment, whether the mechanism is supermodular in that treatment and equilibrium prices
and quantities. Overall, 27 independent computerized sessions were conducted in the RCGD lab at the Uni-
versity of Michigan from April to July, 2001, and in April 2003. We used zTree to program our experiments.
Our subjects were students from the University of Michigan. No subject was used in more than one session,
yielding 324 subjects. Each session lasted approximately one-and-a-half hours. The exchange rate for all
treatments was one dollar for 4250 points. The average earning was $22.82. Experimental instructions are
included in Appendix B. Data are available from the authors upon request.
4 Hypotheses
Given the above design, we next identify our hypotheses. To do so, we ﬁrst deﬁne and discuss two measures
of convergence: the level and speed of convergence.7 In theory, convergence implies that all players play
the stage game equilibrium and no deviation is observed. However, this is not realistic in an experimental
setting. Therefore, we deﬁne the following measures.
DEFINITION 1 The level of convergence at round t, L(t), is measured by the proportion of Nash equilib-
rium play in that round. The level of convergence for a block of rounds, Lb(t1;t2), measures the average
proportion of Nash equilibrium play between rounds t1 and t2, i.e., Lb(t1;t2) =
Pt2
t=t1 L(t)=(t2 ¡ t1 + 1),
where 0 · t1 · t2 · T and T is the total number of rounds.
We deﬁne the level of convergence for both a round and a block of rounds. The block convergence
measure smooths out inter-round variation. However, a particular convergence level does not capture the
change in equilibrium play over time. The following deﬁnition captures the change in equilibrium play
induced by the mechanism and reduces cohort effects.
DEFINITION 2 The convergence-level change, ∆L(¿) is measured by the difference in the proportion of
Nash equilibrium play in the last and ﬁrst ¿ rounds, i.e., ∆L(¿) = Lb(T ¡ ¿ + 1;T) ¡ Lb(1;¿), where
0 < ¿ < T=2, and T is the total number of rounds.
7We thank anonymous referees for suggesting this separation and appropriate measures.
11Ideally, the speed of convergence should measure how quickly all players converge to equilibrium strate-
gies. However, in our experimental setting, we never observe perfect convergence. We therefore use a more
general deﬁnition for the speed of convergence.
DEFINITION 3 For a given level of convergence, L¤ 2 (0;1], the speed of convergence is measured by
the ﬁrst round in which the level of convergence reaches L¤ and does not subsequently drop below this level,
i.e., ¿ such that L(t) ¸ L¤ for any t ¸ ¿. Alternatively, we measure the speed of convergence by the ﬁrst
block in which the level of convergence reaches L¤ and does not subsequently drop below this level, i.e.,
¿1 · ¿2 such that Lb(t1;t2) ¸ L¤ for any t1 ¸ ¿1, t2 ¸ ¿2 and t2 ¡ t1 = (¿2 ¡ ¿1)n, where n is a positive
integer.
We sometimes use the slope of L(t) as a measure of the speed of convergence for computational ease.
We now relate the slope of L(t) and the initial level of convergence L(1) to the speed of convergence.
Assuming Ly(t) is differentiable, where y is a treatment, we establish the following observation.
OBSERVATION 1 If L1(1) ¸ L2(1) and dL1(t)=dt > dL2(t)=dt for all t 2 [1;T], then, given any
L¤ 2 (0;1], the ﬁrst treatment converges more quickly than the second treatment, i.e., ¿1 < ¿2.
Based on theories presented in Section 2, we now form our hypotheses about the level and speed of
convergence. While theories of strategic complementarities do not make any predictions about the speed of
convergence, we form our hypotheses based on previous experiments that incidentally address games with
strategic complementarities.
HYPOTHESIS 1 When ® = 20, increasing ¯ from 0 to 20 signiﬁcantly increases (a) the level and (b) the
speed of convergence.
Hypothesis 1 is based on the theoretical prediction that games with strategic complementarities converge to
the unique Nash equilibrium, as well as on previous experimental ﬁndings that supermodular games perform
robustly better than their non-supermodular counterparts.
HYPOTHESIS 2 When ® = 20, increasing ¯ from 0 to 18 signiﬁcantly increases (a) the level and (b) the
speed of convergence.
Hypothesis 2 is based on the ﬁndings of Falkinger et al. (2000), that average play is close to equilibrium
when the free parameter is slightly below the supermodular threshold.
12HYPOTHESIS 3 When ® = 20, increasing ¯ from 18 to 20 signiﬁcantly increases (a) the level and (b) the
speed of convergence.
Since we have not found any previous experimental studies which compare the performance of games with
strategic complementarities with those near the threshold, Hypothesis 3 is pure speculation.
HYPOTHESIS 4 When ® = 20, increasing ¯ from 20 to 40 does not signiﬁcantly increase either (a) the
level or (b) the speed of convergence.
Since we have not found any previous experimental studies within the class of games with strategic comple-
mentarities, Hypotheses 4 is again our speculation.
HYPOTHESIS 5 When ¯ = 0 or 20, increasing ® from 10 to 20 signiﬁcantly increases (a) the level and
(b) the speed of convergence.
HYPOTHESIS 6 Changing ® from 10 to 20 signiﬁcantly increases the improvement in (a) the level and
(b) the speed of convergence that results from increasing ¯ from 0 to 20.
Hypothesis 5 is based on experimental ﬁndings supporting the General Incentive Hypothesis. Hypothesis 6
is our speculation.
Hypotheses 1 to 6 are concerned with only one measure of performance, convergence to equilibrium.
Other measures, such as efﬁciency and budget balance, can be largely derived from convergence patterns.
Therefore, although we omit the formal hypotheses, we present results regarding these measures in Sections
5 and 6.
5 Experimental Results
In this section, we compare the performance of the mechanism as we vary ® and ¯. At the individual level,
we look at both the level and speed of convergence to subgame-perfect equilibrium and near-equilibrium in
each of the six different treatments. At the aggregate level, we examine the efﬁciency and budget imbalance
generated by each treatment. In the following discussion, we focus on prices rather than on quantity. Recall
that player 1’s best response in the production stage is uniquely determined by p2, and that player 1 has all
of the information needed to select this best response. In our experiment, deviations in the production stage
tend to be small (the average absolute deviation is less than one in 23 of 27 sessions) and does not differ
13signiﬁcantly among treatments. Therefore, it is not surprising that, in all of our analyses, the results for
quantities largely mirror the results for player 2’s price.8
Recall that subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for a stage game is (p¤
1;p¤
2;X¤) = (16;16;32). Since the
strategy space in this experiment is rather large and the payoff function is relatively ﬂat near equilibrium,
a small deviation from equilibrium is not very costly. For example, in the ®20¯20 treatment, a one-unit
unilateral deviation from equilibrium prices costs player 1 $0.005 and player 2 $0.014. Therefore, we check
the ²-equilibrium play by looking at the proportion of price announcements within §1 of the equilibrium
price, and the quantity announcement within §4 of the equilibrium quantity, since a one-unit price change




[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
Figures 1 and 2 contain box and whiskers plots for the prices for each treatment for all 60 rounds by
players 1 and 2, respectively. The box represents the ranges of the 25th and 75th percentiles of prices, while
the whiskers extend to the minimum and maximum prices in each round. The horizontal line within each
box represents the median price. Compared with the ¯ = 0 treatments, equilibrium price convergence is
clearly more pronounced in the supermodular and near-supermodular treatments.
[Table 2 about here.]
To analyze the performance of the compensation mechanism, we ﬁrst compare the convergence level
achieved in the last 20 rounds of each treatment. Table 2 reports the level of convergence (Lb(41;60)) to
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (top two panels) and ²-Nash equilibrium (bottom two panels) for each
sessionunder each of the six differenttreatments, as well as the alternativehypothesesand the corresponding
p-values of one-tailed permutation tests9 under the null hypothesis that the convergence level in the two
treatments are the same. While the proportion of ²-equilibrium play is much higher than the proportion
8Tables are available from the authors upon request.
9The permutation test, also known as the Fisher randomization test, is a nonparametric version of a difference of two means
t-test. (See, e.g., Siegel and Castellan (1988), p.95-100.) The idea is simple and intuitive: by pooling all independent observations,
the p-value is the exact probability of observing a separation between the two treatments as the one observed when the pooled
observations are randomly divided into two equal-sized groups. This test uses all of the information in the sample, and thus has
100% power-efﬁciency. It is among the most powerful of all statistical tests.
14of equilibrium play, the results of the permutation tests largely follow similar patterns. We now formally
test our hypotheses regarding convergence level. Parts 1-3 of Result 1 present the effects of the degree of
strategic complementarity (¯-effects). Parts 4 and 5 present effects due to changes in ® (®-effects).
RESULT 1 (Level of Convergence in the Last 20 Rounds) :





2. When ® = 20, increasing ¯ from 18 to 20 does not change the level of convergence signiﬁcantly.
3. When ® = 20, increasing ¯ from 20 to 40 does not change the level of convergence signiﬁcantly.
4. When ¯ = 0, increasing ® from 10 to 20 weakly increases the level of convergence in p¤
2, and signiﬁ-
cantly increases the level of convergence in ²-p¤
2, but has no signiﬁcant effects on p¤
1 or ²-p¤
1.
5. When ¯ = 20, increasing ® from 10 to 20 weakly increases the level of convergence in p¤





SUPPORT: The last two columns of Table 2 report the corresponding alternative hypotheses and permuta-
tion test results.
By Part 1 of Result 1, we accept Hypotheses 1(a) and 2(a). Part 1 also conﬁrms previous experimen-
tal ﬁndings that supermodular games perform signiﬁcantly better than those far from the supermodular
threshold. Furthermore, near-supermodular games also perform signiﬁcantly better than those far from the
threshold.
However, by Part 2, we reject Hypothesis 3(a). This is the ﬁrst experimental result which shows that,
from a little below the supermodular threshold (¯ = 18) to the threshold (¯ = 20), improvement in con-
vergence level is statistically insigniﬁcant. In other words, we do not see a dramatic improvement at the
threshold. This implies that the performance of near-supermodular games, such as the Falkinger mecha-
nism, ought to be comparable to that of supermodular games.
By contrast, we accept Hypothesis 4(a) by Part 3. This is the ﬁrst experimental result systematically
comparing convergence levels of supermodular games, where theory is silent. The convergence level does
not signiﬁcantly improve as ¯ increases from the threshold, 20, to 40. Therefore, the marginal returns for
being “more supermodular” diminish once the payoffs become supermodular.
10When presenting results throughout the paper, we follow the convention that a signiﬁcance level of 5% or less is signiﬁcant,
while a signiﬁcance level between 5% and 10% is weakly signiﬁcant.
15Proposition 2 predicts convergence under Cournot best reply for any ¯ ¸ 0. However, there is a signiﬁ-
cant difference in convergence level as ¯ increases from 0 to 18, 20 and beyond. We investigate in Section
6 whether this difference persists in the long run.
While Parts 1-3 present the ¯-effects, Parts 4 and 5 examine the ®-effects and we partially accept Hy-
pothesis 5(a). Recall from Equation (5) and subsequent discussions that, at the threshold of strategic com-
plementarity ¯ = 20, player 2’s Nash equilibrium strategy is also a dominant strategy. The ﬁnding of no
®-effect on player 2’s equilibrium play when ¯ = 20 is consistent with this observation.
The above results highlight the convergence level achieved towards the end of the game. However,
these results do not indicate whether players have learned equilibrium strategies. Therefore, we now look
at the improvement in convergence over time as we change the parameters. Our measure, ∆L(20) =
Lb(41;60) ¡ Lb(1;20), is the difference in convergence level between the ﬁrst and last twenty rounds.
[Table 3 about here.]
Table 3 reports the convergence-level change between the ﬁrst and last 20 rounds, ∆L(20), to subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium (top two panels) and ²-Nash equilibrium (bottom two panels) for each session
under each of the six different treatments, as well as the alternative hypotheses and the corresponding p-
values of one-tailed permutation tests. Comparing the permutation test results of Table 3 to those of Table
2, we notice that the ¯-effects in Result 1 persist (although sometimes they are only weakly signiﬁcant).
However, the ®-effects disappear, as higher ® weakly increases the level of convergence in the ﬁrst 20
rounds as well.11
[Table 4 about here.]
Todeterminetheeffectsofstrategiccomplementaritiesandotherfactorsonconvergencelevelandspeed,
we use logit models with clustering at the individual level. The results from these models are presented in
Table 4. The dependent variable is ²-p¤
1 in speciﬁcations (1) and (3), and ²-p¤
2 in speciﬁcations (2) and (4).
In speciﬁcations (1) and (2), the independent variables are: treatment dummies, Dy, where y = ®10¯00,
®20¯00, ¯18, ®10¯20 and ¯40; ln(Round); and a constant. We omit the dummy for ®20¯20. Therefore, in
these two speciﬁcations, restricting learning speed to be the same across treatments, the estimated coefﬁcient
of Dy captures the difference in the convergence level between treatments y and ®20¯20. We use dummies
for different values of ® and ¯, rather than direct parameter values, to avoid assuming a linear relationship
11For example, the permutation test of the null hypothesis of equal proportion against H1: ®10¯20<®20¯20 yields a p-value
of 0:091.
16of parameter effects. Results from these speciﬁcations are largely consistent with Result 1 which uses a
more conservative test. The coefﬁcients of ln(Round) are both positive and highly signiﬁcant, indicating
that players learn to play equilibrium strategies over time. The concave functional form, ln(Round), which
yields a better log-likelihood than either the linear or quadratic functional form, indicates that learning is
rapid at the beginning and decreases over time. We will examine learning in more detail in Section 6.
In speciﬁcations (3) and (4), we use ln(Round), interaction of each of the treatment dummies with
ln(Round), and a constant12 as dependent variables. The interaction term allows different slopes for dif-
ferent treatments. Compared with the coefﬁcient of ln(Round), the coefﬁcient for the interaction term,
Dy ln(Round), captures the slope differences between treatment y and ®20¯20. By Observation 1, we use
the slope of each treatment as a measure for the convergence speed.
RESULT 2 (Speed of Convergence) :




2. When ® = 20, increasing ¯ from 18 to 20 has no signiﬁcant effect on convergence speed.
3. When ® = 20, increasing ¯ from 20 to 40 has no signiﬁcant effect on convergence speed.
4. When ¯ = 0, increasing ® from 10 to 20 has no signiﬁcant effects on convergence speed.
5. When ¯ = 20, increasing ® from 10 to 20 has no signiﬁcant effects on convergence speed.
SUPPORT: Models (3) and (4) in Table 4 report analyses on convergence speed. For each independent
variable, the coefﬁcients, standard errors (in parentheses) and signiﬁcance levels are reported. The second
Wald test looks at whether the coefﬁcient of D®10¯00 ln(Round) equals that of D®20¯00 ln(Round).
Part 1 of Result 2 supports Hypotheses 1(b) and 2(b), while by Part 2 we reject Hypothesis 3(b). Part 3
supports Hypothesis 4(b). Parts 4 and 5 reject Hypothesis 5(b). Result 2 provides the ﬁrst empirical evidence
on the role of strategic complementarity and the speed of convergence.
Although Part 2 indicates that increasing ¯ from 18 to 20 does not signiﬁcantly change convergence
speed, we now investigate whether there are any differences between ¯18 and the supermodular treatments.
12This speciﬁcation restricts the same intercept across all treatments, i.e., initial round proportion of equilibrium play is assumed
to be the same. When including treatment dummies, Wald tests on the hypothesis that the treatment dummy coefﬁcients are all zero
yield p-values of 0.2703 for ²-p
¤
1, and 0.3383 for ²-p
¤
2.
17In particular we compare ®20¯18 with ®20¯20 and ®20¯40.13 In Result 1, we show that these treatments
achieve the same convergence level. Also, we cannot reject the hypothesis that round one prices for each
player are drawn for the same distribution for each treatment.14 As the treatments all start and converge to
similar levels of equilibrium play, we use a more ﬂexible functional form to look for differences in speed.
[Table 5 about here.]
In Table 5, we report the results of logit regressions comparing ®20¯18 with the two ®20 supermodular
treatments. We use Round, ln(Round), and their interactions with ®20¯18 as independent variables to allow
different convergence speeds to the same level of convergence. In model (1), the dependent variable is player
1 ²-equilibrium play. There is no signiﬁcant difference between ®20¯18 and the ®20 supermodular treat-
ments. In model (2), the dependent variable is player 2 ²-equilibrium play. There are signiﬁcant differences
between the near-supermodular and ®20 supermodular treatments. In early rounds, ln(Round) is large rela-
tive to Round. The negative and weakly signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on D®20¯18ln(Round) implies a lower proba-
bility of early-round equilibrium play in ®20¯18 relative to the supermodular treatments. The ¯18 treatment
does catch up to these treatments, which is reﬂected in the positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on D®20¯18
interacted with Round. This result suggest a difference between supermodular and near-supermodular treat-
ments: while they achieve similar convergence levels, the supermodular treatments perform better in early
rounds and thus might reach certain convergence levels faster than their near-supermodular counterparts.
The previous discussion examines the separate effects of strategic complementarity (¯-effects) and ® (®-
effects) on convergence. However, varying ® allows us to test the importance of strategic complementarity
relative to other features of mechanism design. Having a full factorial design in the parameters ® = 10;20
and ¯ = 0;20, we can study whether ® affects the role of strategic complementarity. In particular, as ¯
increases from 0 to 20, we expect improvement in convergence level and speed. We study whether this
improvement changes when ® increases from 10 to 20.
The last two Wald tests in the bottom panel of Table 4 separately examine the ®-effects on convergence
level and speed resulting from increasing ¯ from 0 to 20 (®-effects on ¯-effects). Changing ® from 10 to
20 does not signiﬁcantly change either the level or speed of convergence. This is the ﬁrst empirical result
examining the effects of other factors on the role of strategic complementarity.
So far, we have discussed the performance of the mechanism relative to equilibrium predictions and in-
dividual behavior. We now turn to group-level welfare results. Since the compensation mechanism balances
13We omit ®10¯20 from this analysis. First, it does not achieve the same ²-p
¤
1 convergence level as the other supermodular
treatments. Second, omitting it avoids the possibility of an ®-effect.
14Kolmogorov-Smirnov test result tables are available by request.
18the budget only in equilibrium, total payoffs off the equilibrium path can be only weakly related to efﬁcient
payoffs. Therefore, we use two separate measures to capture welfare implications, an efﬁciency measure
and a measure of budget imbalance.
We ﬁrst deﬁne the per-round efﬁciency measure which includes neither the tax/subsidy nor the penalty
terms, i.e.,
e(t) =
rx(t) ¡ c(x(t)) ¡ e(x(t))
rx¤ ¡ c(x¤) ¡ e(x¤)
;






t2 ¡ t1 + 1
:
RESULT 3 (Efﬁciency in the Last 20 Rounds) :
1. When ® = 20, increasing ¯ from 0 to 18 signiﬁcantly improves efﬁciency, while increasing ¯ from 0
to 20 weakly improves efﬁciency.
2. When ® = 20, increasing ¯ from 18 to 20 has no signiﬁcant effect on efﬁciency.
3. When ® = 20, increasing ¯ from 20 to 40 weakly improves efﬁciency.
4. When ¯ = 0, increasing ® from 10 to 20 weakly improves efﬁciency.
5. When ¯ = 20, increasing ® from 10 to 20 has no signiﬁcant effect on efﬁciency.
[Table 6 about here.]
SUPPORT: Table 6 presents the efﬁciency measure for each session in each treatment in the last 20 rounds
(top panel) and the change in efﬁciency between the ﬁrst and last 20 rounds (bottom panel), the alternative
hypotheses and the results of one-tailed permutation tests.
Result 3 is largely consistent with Result 1, indicating that supermodular and near-supermodular mecha-
nisms induce a signiﬁcantly higher proportion of equilibrium play than mechanisms far from the supermod-
ular threshold. The new ﬁnding is that increasing ¯ from the threshold 20 to 40 weakly improves efﬁciency.
We note that the efﬁciency change between the ﬁrst and last 20 rounds is not signiﬁcantly different across
treatments.
Second, the budget surplus at round t is the sum of the penalty terms, plus tax, minus subsidy in that
round, i.e., s(t) = (® + ¯)(p1(t) ¡ p2(t))2 + p2(t)x(t) ¡ p1(t)x(t): Examining the session-level budget
surplus across all rounds, we ﬁnd the following results. First, 22 out of 27 sessions result in a budget
19surplus. This comes from a combination of our choice of parameters and the dynamics of play. Second,
the only signiﬁcant difference across treatments is that budget surpluses under ®20¯18 and ®20¯20 are
signiﬁcantly lower than those under ®20¯40 (p-values = 0:029 and 0:024 respectively). This ﬁnding points
to a potential cost of driving up the punishment parameter, ¯. In other words, before the system equilibrates,
a high punishment parameter can worsen the budget imbalance problem inherent in the mechanism.
Overall, Results 1 through 3 suggest the following observations regarding games with strategic com-
plementarities. First, in terms of convergence level and speed, supermodular and near-supermodular games
perform signiﬁcantly better than those far under the threshold. Second, while there is no signiﬁcant differ-
ence between supermodular and near-supermodular games in terms of convergence level, early performance
differences may lead to supermodular treatments reaching lower convergence levels more quickly. Third,
beyond the threshold, increasing ¯ has no signiﬁcant effect on either the level or the speed of convergence.
Last, For a given ¯, increasing ® has partial effects on convergence level, but no signiﬁcant effect on con-
vergence speed. To check the persistence of these experimental results in the long run, we use simulations
in Section 6.
6 Simulation Results: Continued Dynamics
Our experiment examines the relationship between strategic complementarity and convergence to equilib-
rium. Learning theory predicts long-run convergence. Figures 1 and 2 show that convergence continues to
improve in later rounds for several treatments, suggesting continued dynamics. Due to time, attention and
resource constraints, it was not feasible to run the experiment for much longer than 60 rounds. Therefore,
we rely on simulations to study continued convergence beyond 60 rounds.
To do so, we look for a learning algorithm which, when calibrated, closely approximates the observed
dynamicpathsover60rounds. Thelargeempiricalliteratureonlearningingames(see, e.g., Camerer(2003),
for a survey) suggests many models. Our interest here is not to compare the performance of various learning
models. We look for learning models that match two criteria. First, we require a model that performs well
in a variety of experimental games. Second, given that our experiment has complete information about the
payoff structure, the model needs to incorporate this information. In the following subsections, we ﬁrst
introduce three learning models which meet our criteria. We then look at how well the learning models
predict the experimental data by calibrating each algorithm on a subset of the experimental data, and then
validating the models on a hold-out sample. We then report the forecasting results using one of the calibrated
algorithms.
206.1 Three Learning Models
The models we examine are stochastic ﬁctitious play with discounting (hereafter shortened as sFP) (Cheung
and Friedman (1997) and Fudenberg and Levine (1998)), functional EWA (fEWA) (Ho, Camerer and Chong
2001) and the payoff assessment learning model (PA) (Sarin and Vahid 1999). We now give a brief overview
of each model. Interested readers are referred to the originals for complete descriptions.
The particular version of sFP that we use is logistic ﬁctitious play (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Levine
(1998) p.199). A player predicts the her match’s price in the next round, p¡i(t + 1) according to,
p¡i(t + 1) =
p¡i(t) +
Pt¡1
¿=1 r¿p¡i(t ¡ ¿)
1 +
Pt¡1
¿=1 r¿ ; (6)
for some discount factor, r 2 [0;1]. Note r = 0 corresponds to the Cournot best reply assessment, p¡i(t +
1) = p¡i(t). When r = 1, it yields the standard ﬁctitious play assessment. The usual adaptive learning
model assumes 0 < r < 1. All observations inﬂuence the expected state but more recent observations have
greater weight.
As opposed to standard ﬁctitious play, stochastic ﬁctitious play allows decision randomization and thus
bettercaptures thehumanlearningprocess. Omittingtimesubscripts, the probabilitythataplayer announces






Given a predicted price, a player is thus more likely to play strategies that yield higher payoffs. How much
more likely is determined by ¸, the sensitivity parameter. As ¸ increases, the probability of a best response
to p¡i increases.
The second model we consider, fEWA, is a one-parameter variant of the experience weighted attrac-
tion model (EWA, Camerer and Ho (1999)). In this model, strategy probabilities are determined by logit
probabilities similar to Equation (7) with actual payoffs (¼(pi;p¡i)) replaced by strategy attraction. In both
variants, strategy attraction, A
j
i(t), and an experience weight, N(t), are updated after every period. The
experience weight is updated according to N(t) = Á(1¡·)¢N(t¡1)+1, where Á is the change-detection












where the indicator function I(p
j
i;pi(t)) equals one if p
j
i = pi(t) and zero otherwise, and ± 2 [0;1] is the
imagination weight. In EWA, all parameters are estimated, whereas in fEWA these parameters (except for





















equals Ái(t), while · equals the Gini coefﬁcient of previous choice frequencies. EWA models encompass a
variety of familiar learning models: cumulative reinforcement learning (± = 0;· = 1;N(0) = 1), weighted
reinforcement learning (± = 0;· = 0;N(0) = 1), weighted ﬁctitious play (± = 1;· = 0), standard
ﬁctitious play (± = Á = 1;· = 0), and Cournot best reply (Á = · = 1;± = 1).
Finally, we introduce the main components of the PA model. For simplicity, we omit all subscripts which
represent player i, and let ¼j(t) represent the actual payoff of strategy j in round t. Since the game has a
large strategy space, we incorporate similarity functions into the model to represent agent use of strategy
similarity. As strategies in this game are naturally ordered by their labels, we use the Bartlett similarity






1 ¡ jj ¡ kj=h if jj ¡ kj < h;
0 otherwise.
In this function, the parameter h determines the h¡1 unplayed strategies on either side of the played strategy
to be updated. When h = 1, fjk(1;t) degenerates into an indicator function equal to one if strategy j is
chosen in round t and zero otherwise.
The PA model assumes that a player is a myopic subjective maximizer. That is, she chooses strategies
based on assessed payoffs, and does not explicitly take into account the likelihood of alternate states. Let
uj(t) denote the subjective assessment of strategy pj at time t, and r the discount factor. Payoff assessments
are updated through a weighted average of his previous assessments and the payoff he actually obtains at
time t. If strategy k is chosen at time t, then:
uj(t + 1) = (1 ¡ rfjk(h;t))uj(t) + rfjk(h;t)¼k(t);8j: (10)
Each period, the assessed strategy payoffs are subject to zero-mean, symmetrically distributed shocks,
zj(t). The decision maker chooses on the basis of his shock-distorted subjective assessments, ˜ uj(t) =
uj(t) + zj(t). At time t he chooses strategy pk if:
˜ uk(t) ¡ ˜ uj(t) > 0;8pj 6= pk: (11)
22Note that mood shocks affect only his choices and not the manner in which assessments are updated.
6.2 Calibration
Literature assessing the performance of learning models contains two approaches to calibration and valida-
tion. The ﬁrst approach calibrates the model on the ﬁrst t rounds and validates on the remaining rounds. The
second approach uses half of the sessions in each treatment to calibrate and the other half to validate. We
choose the latter approach for two reasons. First, this approach is feasible as we have multiple independent
sessions for each treatment. Second, we need not assume that the parameters of later rounds are the same
as those in earlier rounds. We thus calibrate the parameters of each model in blocks of 15 rounds using the
experimental data from the ﬁrst two sessions of each treatment. We then evaluate each model by measuring
how well the parameterized model predicts play in the remaining two or three sessions.
For parameter estimation, we conduct Monte Carlo simulations designed to replicate the characteristics
of the experimental settings. In all calibrations, we exclude the last two rounds (59 and 60) to avoid any end-
of-game effects. We then compare the simulated paths with the experimental data to ﬁnd those parameters
which minimize the mean-squared deviation (MSD) scores. Since the ﬁnal outcome distributions of our data
are unimodal, the simulated mean is an informative statistic and is well captured by MSD (Haruvy and Stahl
2000). Inallsimulations, weusethek-period-aheadratherthantheone-period-aheadapproach15 becausewe
areinterestedinforecastingthelong-runmechanismperformance. Indoingso, wechoosek = 10;15;20;30
and 58. We look at blocks of 10, 15, 20 and 30 rounds because as players gain information and experience,
information use may change over time. We use k = 15 rather than the other values because it best captures
the actual dynamics in the experimental data.
Each simulation consists of 1,500 games (18,000 players) and the following steps:
1. Simulated players are randomly matched into pairs at the beginning of each round.
2. Simulated players select price announcements.
(a) Initial round: Based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on the actual round-one price distribution,
we reject the null hypotheses of uniform distribution (d = 0:250, p-value = 0.000) and normal
distribution (d = 0:381, p-value = 0.000). We thus follow the convention (e.g., Ho et al. (2001))
and use the actual ﬁrst-round empirical distribution of choices to generate the ﬁrst round choices.
[Figure 3 about here.]
15Erev and Haruvy (2000) discuss the tradeoffs of the two approaches.
23Figure 3 presents the actual ﬁrst round empirical distribution of choices for players 1 and 2,
respectively.
(b) Subsequent rounds: Simulated player strategies are determined via Equation (7) for sFP and
fEWA, and (11) for PA.
3. Simulated player 1’s quantity choice is based on the following steps:
(a) Determine each player 1’s best response to p2.
(b) Determine whether player 1 will deviate from the best response via the actual probability of
errors for each block.
(c) If yes, deviate via the actual mean and standard deviation for the block. Otherwise, play the best
response.
4. Payoffs are determined by the payoff function of the compensation mechanism, Equation (1), for each
treatment.
5. Assessments are updated according to Equation (8) for fEWA and (10) for PA.
6. Proceed to the next round.
The discount factor, r 2 [0;1], is searched at a grid size of 0.1. The parameter ¸ is searched at a grid
size of 0.1 in the interval [1:5;10:5] for fEWA, and [1:5;25:0] for sFP. The size of the similarity window,
h 2 [1;10], is searched at a grid size of 1. Mood shocks, z, are drawn from a uniform distribution16 on an
interval [¡a;a], where a is searched on [0;500] with a step size of 50. For all parameters, intervals and grid
sizes are determined by payoff magnitude.
[Table 7 about here.]
Table 7 reports the calibrated parameters (discount factor, sensitivity parameter, mood shock interval
and similarity window size) for the ﬁrst two sessions of each treatment in 15-round blocks.17 Estimated
parameters for the supermodular and near-supermodular treatments are consistent with the increased level
of convergence over time, while the ¯00 treatments are not. The second column (sFP) reports the best-ﬁt
16Chen and Khoroshilov (2003) compare three versions of PA models where shocks were drawn from uniform, logistic and
double exponential distributions on two sets of experimental data and ﬁnd that the performance of the three versions of PA were
statistically indistinguishable.
17We also calibrate all parameters for the entire 60 rounds, but do not report results due to space limitations.
24parameters for the stochastic ﬁctitious play model. With the exception of treatment ®20¯00, the discount
factoriscloseto1.0, indicatingthatplayerskeeptrackofallpastplaywhenformingbeliefsaboutopponent’s
next move. 18 Given these beliefs, the increasing sensitivity parameter, ¸, for all treatments except ®10¯00
indicates that the likelihood of best response increases over time. The third column reports calibration
results for the fEWA model. Again, with the exception of treatment ®10¯00, the parameter ¸ increases
over time. The ﬁnal column reports calibration of parameters in the PA model. For each treatment except
®10¯00, a middle block has the highest discount factor, indicating more weight on new information about
a strategy’s performance. The second parameter in the PA model represents the upper bound of the interval
from which shocks are drawn, a. Experimentation should decrease in the ﬁnal rounds. Indeed, for all
treatments, the estimated mood-shock ranges (weakly) decrease from the third to the last block. Finally, the
decreasingsimilarity windowsfrom the third to ﬁnal block indicate decreasing strategyspill-over. Relatively
large discount factors in the third block, combined with relatively large similarity windows, ﬂatten the
payoff assessments around the most recently played strategies, consistent with the local experimentation (or
relatively stabilized play) observed in the data.
6.3 Validation
Usingtheparameterscalibratedontheﬁrsttwosessionsofeachtreatment, wenextcomparetheperformance
of the three learning models in predicting play in the hold-out sample. For comparison, we also present the
performance of two static models. The random choice model assumes that each player randomly chooses
any strategy with equal probability for all rounds. This model only incorporates number of strategies, and
thus providesa minimum standard for a dynamic learning model. Theequilibrium modelassumes that each
player plays the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium every round. This model conveys the same information
as the proportion of equilibrium play presented in Section 5, but with a different metric (MSD).
[Table 8 about here.]
Table 8 presents each model’s MSD scores for each hold-out session. Recall that two of each treatment’s
four or ﬁve independent sessions are used for calibration, and the rest for validation. The results indicate
that all three learning models perform signiﬁcantly better than the random choice model (p-value < 0:01,
one-sided permutation tests) and, by a larger margin, signiﬁcantly better than the equilibrium model (p-value
< 0:01, one-sided permutation tests). While the equilibrium model does a poor job of explaining overall ex-
18As the discount factor is zero in Cournot best reply, we can reject this model based on our estimation of the discount factors.
25perimental data, its performance improvement over time19 justiﬁes the use of learning models to explain the
dynamics of play. Within each of the top three panels (i.e., learning models), session-level MSD scores are
lower for the supermodular and near-supermodular treatments, indicating that each learning model does a
better job explaining behavior in those treatments. Indeed, in the empirical learning literature learning mod-
els ﬁt better in experiments with better equilibrium convergence (see, e.g., Chen and Khoroshilov (2003)).
RESULT 4 (Comparison of Learning Models) The performance of PA is weakly better than that of fEWA
and strictly better than that of sFP. The performances of fEWA and sFP are not signiﬁcantly different.
SUPPORT: Table 8 reports the MSD scores for each independent session in the hold-out sample under each
model. The Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests show that the MSD scores under PA are weakly lower than those
under fEWA (z = ¡0:085, p-value = 0:068), and strictly lower than those under sFP (z = ¡0:028, p-value
= 0:023). Using the same test, we cannot reject the hypothesis that fEWA and sFP yield the same MSD
scores (z = 0:662, p-value= 0:508).
Although the the performance of PA is only weakly better than that of fEWA, the overall MSD scores
for PA are lower than those for fEWA for every treatment. Therefore, we use PA for forecasting beyond 60
rounds.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Figure 4 presents the simulated path of the calibrated PA model and compares it with the actual data in
thehold-outsamplebysuperimposingthesimulatedmean(blackline)plusandminusonestandarddeviation
(grey lines) on the actual mean (black box) and standard deviation (error bars). The simulation does a good
job of tracking both the mean and the standard deviation of the actual data. However, in treatments ®10¯00
and ®20¯40, the reduction in variance lags that seen in the middle rounds of the experiment.
6.4 Forecasting
We now report the results from the PA model. As the strategic complementarity predictions concern long-
run performance, we use the calibrated parameters for the ﬁrst 58 rounds to simulate play in later rounds.
This exercise allows us to study convergence and efﬁciency in long but ﬁnite horizons.
In all forecasting exercises we base all post-58 round parameters on those from the last block (calibrated
from rounds 46–58). Since we do not know how these parameters might change beyond 60 rounds, we use
19We omit the table to show the performance of the equilibrium model in blocks of 15 rounds, as the information is repetitive
with Figures 1 and 2.
26three different speciﬁcations. First, we retain all ﬁnal-block parameters. Second, we exponentially decay in
subsequent blocks the probability of deviation from the best response in the production stage.20 Third, we
exponentially decay the shock interval in subsequent blocks. As all three speciﬁcations yield qualitatively
similar results, we report results from only the third speciﬁcation due to space limitations.21 In presenting
the results, we use the shorthand notation x > y to denote a measure under treatment x is signiﬁcantly
higher than that under treatment y at the 5% level or less, and x » y to denote that the measures are not
signiﬁcantly different at the 5% level.
[Figure 5 about here.]
The top and bottom rows of Figure 5 report the simulated and actual proportion of ²-equilibrium play,
respectively. We report only the results for the ﬁrst 500 rounds since the dynamics do not change much
thereafter. In our simulation, all treatments reach higher convergence levels than those achieved in the 60
rounds of the experiment. Since the simulated variance reduction lags that of the experiment, round 60 re-
sults are not achieved until approximately 90 rounds of simulation. We further note that these improvements
slow down after 200 rounds. The proportion of ²-equilibrium play is bounded by 72% for player 1 and 93%
for player 2. We now outline the simulation results.
RESULT 5 (Level of Convergence in Round 500) : In the simulated data for player 1, at round 500, we
have the following level of convergence ranking in:
1. p¤
1: ®20¯18 » ®20¯40 > ®20¯20 > ®10¯20 > ®20¯00 > ®10¯00;
2. ²-p¤
1: ®20¯18 > ®20¯40 > ®20¯20 > ®10¯20 > ®20¯00 > ®10¯00;
3. p¤
2: ®20¯40 > ®20¯18 » ®10¯20 > ®20¯20 > ®20¯00 > ®10¯00, and
4. ²-p¤
2: ®20¯40 > ®20¯18 > ®10¯20 > ®20¯20 > ®20¯00 > ®10¯00:
[Table 9 about here.]
20In block k > 4, we use the probability of deviation, Probk = minf
Prob4
(k¡4)2;10
¡8g. We set a lower bound of 10
¡8 to avoid
the division by zero problem.
21Different sequences of random numbers produce slightly different parameters estimates. While the convergence level of a
given treatment for a given set of parameter estimates is not affected by the sequence of random numbers, this convergence level
is somewhat sensitive to the exact parameter calibration. We therefore conduct four different calibrations for each treatment, and
select the parameters which yield the highest level. The relative rankings of treatments are quite robust with respect to which ordinal
selected.
27SUPPORT:ThefourthandseventhcolumnsofTable9reportp-valuesfort-testsoftheprecedingalternative
hypotheses for players 1 and 2 respectively.
Comparing Results 1 and 5, we ﬁrst note that the four supermodular and near-supermodular treatments
continue to dominate the ¯00 treatments. In fact, the simulations suggest that the gap remains constant
compared with ®20¯00, and actually increases compared with ®10¯00. Unlike Result 1, however, the four
dominant treatments differ. In particular, ®20¯18 performs better in terms of player 1’s convergence, and
®20¯40 in terms of player 2’s , although the differences within the top four treatments are smaller than the
differences between these four and the ¯00 treatments. In addition, an increase in ® signiﬁcantly improves
convergence by a large margin (40-80%) for both players when ¯ = 0.
It is instructive to compare these results with those concerning the speed of convergence in our experi-
mental treatments. In terms of convergence to ²-p2, our regression results (Table 5) indicate that ®20¯18’s
performance in later rounds enables it to achieve the same convergence level as the supermodular treatments.
This trend continues in our simulations, as ®20¯18 performs robustly well compared to the supermodular
treatments. Likewise, in our analysis of the experimental results, the convergence speed of ®20¯40 was
not signiﬁcantly different than those of the other dominant treatments. However, in our simulations, this
treatment dominates all treatments in player 2 equilibrium play.
In our simulations, the convergence improvement due to increasing ¯ from 0 to 20 does depend on ®
(®-effect on ¯-effect). An increase in ® signiﬁcantly decreases the improvement in convergence level (all
p-values for one-sided t-tests are less than 0:01). Due to the relatively poor performance of ®10¯00 in our
simulations, increasing ® from 10 to 20 when ¯ = 0 improves convergence more dramatically in round 500
than in rounds 40-60. In the long run, an increase in ® is a partial substitute for an increase in ¯.
[Table 10 about here.]
We now use Deﬁnition 3 to examine the convergence speed in the long run. Table 10 presents results
for the ﬁrst time a treatment reaches the level of convergence, L¤. We omit the two ¯00 treatments since
they do not converge to the same levels as the other treatments. In terms of player 1, ®20¯18 achieves the
fastest convergence for all levels L¤. However, the picture for player 2 convergence is more subtle. First,
for the ¯20 and ¯18 treatments, the speeds of convergence to all L¤ are remarkably similar. While ®20¯40
lags the other treatments in terms of achieving 80% ²-equilibrium play for player 2, it is the only treatment
to achieve L¤ = 90%.
Apart from convergence to equilibrium, it is also important to look at long-run welfare properties. We
evaluate mechanism performance using the measures presented in Section 5.
28[Figure 6 about here.]
Figure 6 summarizes the short-run and long-run efﬁciency achieved by each of the treatments. The top
panel reports simulated results, while the bottom row reports the actual data. In the long run, supermodular
and near-supermodular treatments continue to differ from the ¯00 treatments, with ®20 superior to ®10 in
the ¯00 treatments. We now present our efﬁciency results.
RESULT 6 (Efﬁciency in Round 500) :
1. In the simulated data, the following relative efﬁciency ranking of the treatments in round 500 is sig-
niﬁcant:
®20¯40 > ®20¯18 > ®10¯20 > ®20¯20 > ®20¯00 > ®10¯00:
2. At round 500, efﬁciency of treatment ®10¯00 is approximately 78%, that of ®20¯00 approaches 93%,
while that of other four treatments is over 98%.
[Table 11 about here.]
SUPPORT: Table 11 reports results of t-tests comparing efﬁciency in different treatments.
Efﬁciency is determined solely by the quantity produced, which in turn is a function of p2. Therefore,
efﬁciency rankings match those for p2-convergence (Result 5). Another interesting welfare result is the
overall budget balance. After 500 rounds, the magnitude of budget imbalance is signiﬁcantly closer to zero
for all treatments except for ®10¯00. In fact, decreasing ® from 20 to 10 signiﬁcantly increases the deﬁcit
for both ¯00 and ¯20. Finally, ®20¯40 is the only treatment that has an overall budget surplus after 500
rounds, although this surplus is approaching zero.
7 Interpretation and Discussion
The underlying force for convergence in games with strategic complementarities is the combination of the
slope of the best-response functions and adaptive learning by players. In the compensation mechanisms,
the slope of player 2’s best response function is determined by ¯. As ® and ¯ determine the penalty
for mismatched prices, we seriously consider the possibility that convergence in supermodular and near-
supermodular treatments to an equilibrium where both players announce the same price is not due to strate-
gic complementarities, but rather is due to increases in ® and ¯ making the penalty terms more prominent
and matching strategies more focal.22 We thus have two hypotheses to explain the observed improvement
22We thank an anonymous referee and the co-editor for pointing this out.
29in convergence to equilibrium play in supermodular and near-supermodular treatments: a best-response
hypothesis and a matching hypothesis. In this section, we present evidence that the improvement in conver-
gence is due to payoff-relevant changes to best responses and not due to matching becoming more focal.
While the focal point hypothesis suggests that players converge to a match, it does not specify the price
at which they match. In the ﬁrst round of our experiments (Figure 3), almost 50% of all prices were 20, and
less than 10% were in the ²-equilibrium range of [15;17]. In the ﬁnal rounds of our experiments, play in the
four supermodular or near-supermodular treatments converges strongly to this range, suggesting more than
simple matching.
By Equation (4), player 1’s best response is always to match regardless of p2. By the General Incentive
Hypothesis, we expect more matching behavior by player 1 as ® increases. However, by Equation (5),
matching is a best response for player 2 only in equilibrium. Therefore, player 2 data can help us separate
the best-response and matching hypotheses.
We ﬁrst investigate which model better explains our experimental data. We operationalize the the best
response hypothesis by the stochastic ﬁctitious play model of Section 6 and the matching hypothesis with
a stochastic matching model.23 In both models, the predicted player 1 price is speciﬁed by Equation (6).
In the matching model, player 2 plays this price with probability 1 ¡ ², and one of the other 40 prices with
probability ²=40. We estimate ² using the ﬁrst two sessions of each treatment.24 We then compare the
performance of the matching model with the sFP model using the hold-out sample. Using the Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests to compare the MSD scores in the hold-out sample, we conclude that sFP explains player
2’s behavior signiﬁcantly better than the matching model (p-value = 0.006). We conclude that best response
to a predicted price explains behavior signiﬁcantly better than the matching model.
Wenextinvestigatewhetherdifferencesinthecostofmatching, deﬁnedasthedifferencebetweenmatch-
ing and best-response proﬁts, can explain all of the differences in matching behavior among treatments, or
whether there exists additional matching behavior that cannot be explained by payoff-relevant factors.
We examine the probability that player 2 tries to match the anticipated player 1 price. We do not know
what price player 2 anticipates. To estimate how players weigh history, we calibrate a matching model in a
manner similar to that outlined in Section 6.2. We assume a player matches the price he anticipates, given
by Equation (6), and we ﬁnd the discount rate for each treatment that minimizes MSD.25 This gives us the
23We do not report the results of the deterministic matching model as it performs signiﬁcantly worse than its stochastic counter-
part.
24Estimated ² in each block are as follows: ®10¯00 = f1:0;:7;:6;:8g;®20¯00 = f:7;:6;:5;:4g;®20¯18 =
f:7;:2;:3;:3g;®10¯20 = f:5;:3;:3;:2g;®20¯20 = f:1;0;0;0g;®20¯40 = f:2;0;0;:1g.
25In all treatments, the calibrated discount rate is r = 0:1.
30anticipated price that best explains the matching hypothesis. Using this discount rate, we calculate, for each
t > 1, an anticipated player 1 price, ¯ p1, for each player 2. We also calculate the opportunity cost of matching
¯ p1, equal to the difference between best-response and matching proﬁts. This opportunity cost captures the
payoff relevant effects of ¯ and also depends on the price to be matched.
Wenextregresstheprobabilitythatplayer2matchestheanticipatedprice, Prob(p2 = ¯ p1), onln(Round),
treatment dummies, and treatment dummies interacted with ln(Round). In one speciﬁcation, we include
the cost of matching as a regressor. If parameter changes make matching more focal, then changes in the
cost of matching will not explain all of the changes in probability of matching.
[Table 12 about here.]
Table 12 presents the results of two random-effects probit models. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, we do not
include the cost of matching as a regressor. In this speciﬁcation, the coefﬁcient for ¯ = 0 is negative and
signiﬁcant; thus reducing ¯ from 20 to 0 decreases the probability that player 2 will try to match player
1’s price. Including the cost of matching in the regression, however, we ﬁnd that neither the dummies nor
their interactions are signiﬁcant, while the coeffecient on the cost of matching is signiﬁcant and negative.
This ﬁnding suggests that the rise in matching that occurs when we increase ¯ from 0 to 20 is not because
matching is more focal, but rather because an increase of ¯ decreases the cost of matching.26
8 Concluding Remarks
The appeal of games with strategic complementarities is simple: as long as players are adaptive learners, the
game will, in the limit, converge to the set bounded by the largest and smallest Nash equilibria. This conver-
gence depends on neither initial conditions nor the assumption of a particular learning model. Unfortunately,
while many competitive environments are supermodular,27 many are not. In this study, we examine whether
there are non-supermodular games which have the same convergence properties as supermodular ones. We
also study whether there exists a clear convergence ranking among games with strategic complementarities.
Our results conﬁrm the ﬁndings of previous experimental studies that supermodular games perform
signiﬁcantly better than games far below the supermodular threshold. However, from a little below the
threshold to the threshold, the change in convergence level is statistically insigniﬁcant. This results suggests
26We consider other speciﬁcations of anticipated price, including the averages of the last 1, 2, 3 and 4 prices seen. In only one
speciﬁcation was a dummy or its interaction with ln(Round) signiﬁcant. In that speciﬁcation, the coefﬁcient ¯ = 18 is positive,
and its interaction with ln(Round) is negative, a ﬁnding which is not consistent with a focal point hypothesis.
27Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Topkis (1998) both present numerous examples of games with strategic complementarities.
31that in the context of mechanism design, the designer need not be overly concerned with setting parameters
that are ﬁrmly above the supermodular threshold—close is just as good. It also enlarges the set of robustly
stable games. For example, the Falkinger mechanism (Falkinger 1996) is not supermodular, but close. This
results suggest that near-supermodular games perform like supermodular ones.
Our next result concerns convergence performance within the class of games with strategic complemen-
tarities. Variations in the degree of complementarities have no signiﬁcant effect on performance within the
60 experimental rounds. However, our simulations suggest an increased degree of strategic complementari-
ties leads to improved convergence in the long run.
Finally the generalized compensation mechanism we use to study convergence issues has a parameter
unrelated to the degree of complementarities. We use this parameter to study the effects factors not related
to strategic complementarities on the performance of supermodular games. For a given level of strategic
complementarity, the factors have partial effects on convergence level and speed, but the effects of strategic
complementarities are largely robust to variations in these other factors. In the long run, these effects persist,
and we ﬁnd evidence that strengthening the strategic complementarities in one player’s strategy can partially
substitute for the lack of strategic complementarities in the other’s.
A word of caution is in order. In a single experimental setting, it is infeasible to study a large number
of games in a wide range of complex environments. While this is the ﬁrst systematic experimental study of
the role of strategic complementarities in equilibrium convergence, the applicability of our results to other
games needs to be veriﬁed in future experiments. In the only other study of this kind, Arifovic and Ledyard
(2001) study similar questions using the Groves-Ledyard mechanism. Their results are encouraging, as their
results are consistent with ours.
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35Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of Proposition 2: We omit the proofs of Parts 1, 2 and 4, as they follow directly from the previous
analysis and Proposition 1. We now present the proof for Part 3. If players follow Cournot best reply
dynamics, we can rewrite Equations (4) and (5) as
p1(t + 1) = p2(t);









4c2 . This is equivalent to
p1(t + 1) ¡ p1(t) = p2(t) ¡ p1(t);
p2(t + 1) ¡ p2(t) = mp1(t) ¡ p2(t) + n:
The analogous differential equation system is
˙ p1 = p2 ¡ p1;
˙ p2 = mp1 ¡ p2 + n: (12)







(p ¡ mp ¡ n)dp;
where p0 ¸ 0 is a constant. We now show that V (p1;p2) is the Lyapunov function of system (12).
Deﬁne G(p1) ´
R p1










As c > 0 and e > 0, for any ¯ ¸ 0, we always have m < 1. Therefore, the function G(p1) has a global
minimum, which is characterized by the following ﬁrst order condition:
dG(p1)
dp1
= (1 ¡ m)p1 ¡ n = 0:
Therefore, p1 = n
1¡m = er
e+c ´ p¤ is the global minimum. When p1 = p2 = p¤,
(p1¡p2)2
2 also reaches its
global minimum. Therefore, V (p1;p2) is at its global minimum when p1 = p2 = p¤.








= (p1 ¡ p2 + (1 ¡ m)p1 ¡ n)(p2 ¡ p1) + (p2 ¡ p1)(mp1 ¡ p2 + n)
= (p2 ¡ p1)(2p1 ¡ 2p2)
= ¡2(p1 ¡ p2)2 · 0
36Let B be an open ball about (p¤
1;p¤
2) in the plane. For all (p1;p2) 6= (p¤
1;p¤
2), ˙ V < 0. Therefore, (p¤
1;p¤
2) is
an globally asymptotically stable equilibrium of (12).
Appendix B. Experiment Instructions
Instructions for the ®20¯20 treatment is attached. Instructions for other treatments are identical except
for the parameters involving ® and ¯.
Experiment Instructions – Mechanism A20 B20
Introduction
² You are about to participate in a decision process in which one of numerous alternatives is selected
in each of 60 rounds. This is part of a study intended to provide insight into certain features of
decision processes. If you follow the instructions carefully and make good decisions you may earn a
considerable amount of money. You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment.
² During the experiment, we ask that you please do not talk to each other. If you have a question, please
raise your hand and an experimenter will assist you.
Procedure
² You will be randomly assigned to one of two groups: the Blue group or the Red Group. There will be
6 players in each group. You will stay in the same group for the entire experiment.
² In each of 60 rounds, you will be randomly matched with a player from the other group. You will not
know the identity of your Match. Your payoff each round depends only on the decisions made by you
and your Match.
² In each of 60 rounds, Red will produce a quantity, Q. Red gets a revenue of 240 ¢ Q + 250 and pays
the production cost of 5
4 ¢ Q2. Red’s production imposes a loss of 5
2 ¢ Q2 on Blue.
² In order to compensate Blue’s loss, prior to production, Blue and Red simultaneously announce a
price, PBlue and PRed, respectively. Red will pay a tax of 10¢PBlue ¢Q. Blue will receive a compen-
sation of 10 ¢ PRed ¢ Q. Note that Blue’s announcement, PBlue, determines Red’s tax rate; and Red’s
announcement, PRed, determines Blue’s compensation rate.
² If PBlue and PRed are not the same, each will pay a penalty proportional to (PBlue ¡ PRed)2.
37² Each round consists of two stages: the Announcement Stage and the Production Stage.
– Announcement Stage: Blue selects PBlue, an integer between 0 and 40. At the same time, Red
selects PRed, also an integer between 0 and 40.
– Production Stage: Red then selects the quantity for that period, Q, an integer between 0 and 50.
This quantity is affected by PBlue. When Red chooses Q, Red’s terminal will display a payoff
table listing Red’s payoff for each Q.
Payoffs
² Per Round Payoffs: Red
PayoﬀRed = 240 ¢ Q + 250





¡ 10 ¢ PBlue ¢ Q
| {z } ¡ 20 ¢ (PBlue ¡ PRed)2
| {z }
Revenue Production Cost Tax Penalty
Revenue: Red receives 240 points for each unit Red produces plus 250 points.
Production Cost: This term represents the cost of producing Q units.
Tax: Red pays a tax to compensate Blue. The tax rate, PBlue, is announced by Blue.
Penalty: Red is penalized for any difference between PBlue and PRed.
² Per Round Payoffs: Blue
PayoﬀBlue = 10 ¢ PRed ¢ Q





¡ 20 ¢ (PBlue ¡ PRed)2
| {z }
Compensation Loss Penalty
Compensation: Blue receives a compensation. The compensation rate, PRed, is announced by Red.
Loss: This term represents Blue’s loss due to Red’s production.
Penalty: Blue is penalized for any difference between PBlue and PRed.
² There will be 60 rounds. There will be no practice rounds. From the ﬁrst round, you will be paid for
each decision you make.
² Your total payoff is the sum of your payoffs in all rounds.
² The exchange rate is $1 for points.
38Information At the end of each round, you are informed of your result of the round:
² Your Price
² The Price of your Match for that round
² The Quantity selected that round
² Your Payoff
We encourage you to earn as much cash as you can. Are there any questions?
39Parameters and Treatments Properties Equilibrium
®




0 (4 sessions) (5 sessions)
®20¯18
¯ 18 (4 sessions) No (16, 16, 32)
®10¯20 ®20¯20
20 (5 sessions) (5 sessions)
®20¯40
40 (4 sessions) Yes (16, 16, 32)
Table 1: Features of Experimental Sessions
40Proportion of Nash Price 1 (p¤
1) Permutation Tests
Treatment Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5 Overall H1 p-value
®10¯00 0.000 0.008 0.158 0.008 0.044 ®10¯00<®20¯00 0.397
®20¯00 0.000 0.083 0.083 0.042 0.058 0.053 ®20¯00<®20¯20 0:008¤¤¤
®20¯18 0.125 0.117 0.100 0.192 0.133 ®20¯00<®20¯18 0:008¤¤¤
®10¯20 0.242 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.208 0.130 ®10¯20<®20¯20 0:064¤
®20¯20 0.325 0.267 0.208 0.058 0.367 0.245 ®20¯18<®20¯20 0:064¤
®20¯40 0.175 0.400 0.158 0.133 0.217 ®20¯20<®20¯40 0.643
Proportion of Nash Price 2 (p¤
2) Permutation Tests
Treatment Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5 Overall H1 p-value
®10¯00 0.025 0.042 0.025 0.067 0.040 ®10¯00<®20¯00 0:056¤
®20¯00 0.067 0.083 0.033 0.075 0.050 0.062 ®20¯00<®20¯20 0:032¤¤
®20¯18 0.133 0.292 0.108 0.258 0.198 ®20¯00<®20¯18 0:008¤¤¤
®10¯20 0.392 0.108 0.175 0.067 0.667 0.282 ®10¯20<®20¯20 0.504
®20¯20 0.308 0.117 0.483 0.017 0.450 0.275 ®20¯18<®20¯20 0.238
®20¯40 0.325 0.492 0.233 0.233 0.321 ®20¯20<®20¯40 0.365
Proportion of ²-Nash Price 1 (²-p¤
1) Permutation Tests
Treatment Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5 Overall H1 p-value
®10¯00 0.108 0.200 0.350 0.158 0.204 ®10¯00<®20¯00 0.183
®20¯00 0.067 0.458 0.358 0.183 0.425 0.298 ®20¯00<®20¯20 0:087¤
®20¯18 0.317 0.625 0.300 0.583 0.456 ®20¯00<®20¯18 0.103
®10¯20 0.475 0.200 0.300 0.375 0.492 0.368 ®10¯20<®20¯20 0.194
®20¯20 0.450 0.558 0.475 0.133 0.775 0.478 ®20¯18<®20¯20 0.444
®20¯40 0.458 0.492 0.375 0.442 0.442 ®20¯20<®20¯40 0.643
Proportion of ²-Nash Price 2 (²-p¤
2) Permutation Tests
Treatment Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5 Overall H1 p-value
®10¯00 0.133 0.200 0.242 0.225 0.200 ®10¯00<®20¯00 0:016¤¤
®20¯00 0.300 0.400 0.200 0.275 0.333 0.302 ®20¯00<®20¯20 0:016¤¤
®20¯18 0.717 0.667 0.342 0.700 0.606 ®20¯00<®20¯18 0:016¤¤
®10¯20 0.650 0.517 0.542 0.400 0.892 0.600 ®10¯20<®20¯20 0.564
®20¯20 0.533 0.592 0.642 0.225 0.900 0.578 ®20¯18<®20¯20 0.556
®20¯40 0.825 0.792 0.467 0.517 0.650 ®20¯20<®20¯40 0.294
Note: Signiﬁcant at: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level.
Table 2: Level of Convergence in the Last 20 Rounds
41Change in Proportion of Nash Price 1 (p¤
1) Permutation Tests
Treatment Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5 Overall H1 p-value
®10¯00 -0.025 -0.017 0.083 -0.017 0.006 ®10¯00<®20¯00 0.302
®20¯00 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.018 ®20¯00<®20¯20 0:004¤¤¤
®20¯18 0.100 0.083 0.050 0.092 0.081 ®20¯00<®20¯18 0:016¤¤
®10¯20 0.242 0.017 0.050 -0.067 0.192 0.087 ®10¯20<®20¯20 0.155
®20¯20 0.225 0.192 0.083 0.042 0.233 0.155 ®20¯18<®20¯20 0.103
®20¯40 0.100 0.383 0.158 0.092 0.183 ®20¯20<®20¯40 0.381
Change in Proportion of Nash Price 2 (p¤
2) Permutation Tests
Treatment Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5 Overall H1 p-value
®10¯00 0.000 0.017 0.017 0.008 0.010 ®10¯00<®20¯00 0.183
®20¯00 0.033 0.067 -0.042 0.042 0.050 0.030 ®20¯00<®20¯20 0:044¤¤
®20¯18 0.108 0.250 0.000 0.167 0.131 ®20¯00<®20¯18 0:054¤
®10¯20 0.275 0.025 0.100 0.017 0.592 0.202 ®10¯20<®20¯20 0.492
®20¯20 0.217 0.058 0.333 0.008 0.400 0.203 ®20¯18<®20¯20 0.238
®20¯40 0.208 0.467 0.208 0.117 0.250 ®20¯20<®20¯40 0.349
Change in Proportion of ²-Nash Price 1 (²-p¤
1) Permutation Tests
Treatment Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5 Overall H1 p-value
®10¯00 -0.058 0.058 0.167 0.075 0.060 ®10¯00<®20¯00 0.222
®20¯00 -0.025 0.300 0.067 0.042 0.233 0.123 ®20¯00<®20¯20 0:099¤
®20¯18 0.192 0.425 0.150 0.267 0.258 ®20¯00<®20¯18 0:087¤
®10¯20 0.367 0.033 0.142 0.092 0.433 0.213 ®10¯20<®20¯20 0.349
®20¯20 0.283 0.333 0.183 0.033 0.442 0.255 ®20¯18<®20¯20 0.492
®20¯40 0.158 0.300 0.283 -0.017 0.181 ®20¯20<®20¯40 0.779
Change in Proportion of ²-Nash Price 2 (²-p¤
2) Permutation Tests
Treatment Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5 Overall H1 p-value
®10¯00 0.000 0.092 0.050 0.092 0.058 ®10¯00<®20¯00 0.183
®20¯00 0.200 0.217 -0.100 0.117 0.183 0.123 ®20¯00<®20¯20 0:032¤¤
®20¯18 0.483 0.492 0.025 0.333 0.333 ®20¯00<®20¯18 0:064¤
®10¯20 0.425 0.142 0.192 0.083 0.583 0.285 ®10¯20<®20¯20 0.508
®20¯20 0.283 0.192 0.333 0.142 0.450 0.280 ®20¯18<®20¯20 0.683
®20¯40 0.308 0.583 0.317 0.033 0.310 ®20¯20<®20¯40 0.373
Note: Signiﬁcant at: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level.
Table 3: Level-of-Convergence Change: Last 20 Rounds-First 20 Rounds




















ln(Round) 0.599 0.752 0.676 0.807
(0.067)*** (0.072)*** (0.095)*** (0.092)***
D®10¯00 ln(Round) -0.248 -0.416
(0.092)*** (0.097)***
D®20¯00 ln(Round) -0.151 -0.317
(0.097) (0.089)***




D¯40 ln(Round) -0.011 0.100
(0.094) (0.101)
Constant -2.614 -2.635 -2.865 -2.820
(0.298)*** (0.293)*** (0.212)*** (0.208)***
Observations 9720 9720 9720 9720
Number of groups 162 162 162 162
Log Likelihood -4588.718 -4807.181 -4564.832 -4750.630
D®10¯00 = D®20¯00 1.46 1.27
D®10¯00 ln(Round)=D®20¯00 ln(Round) 1.32 1.21
D®10¯20 ¡ D®10¯00 = ¡D®20¯00
0.04 1.11
D®10¯20 ln(Round) ¡ D®10¯00 ln(Round) = ¡D®20¯00 ln(Round) 0.03 1.06
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the individual level.
2. Signiﬁcant at: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level.
3. Dy is the dummy variable for treatment y.
4. The bottom panel presents null hypotheses and Wald Â
2(1) test statistics.















Log Likelihood -2879.15 -2994.20
Notes:
1. Standard errors in parentheses.
2. Signiﬁcant at: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level.
3. Dy is the dummy variable for treatment y.
Table 5: Convergence Speed: Logit models with individulal-level clustering comparing ®20¯18 with the
®20 supermodular treatments achieving similar convergence levels.
44Efﬁciency Induced: Last 20 Rounds
Treatment Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5 Overall H1 p-value
®10¯00 0.600 0.671 0.804 0.858 0.733 ®10¯00<®20¯00 0:087¤
®20¯00 0.650 0.870 0.907 0.873 0.825 0.825 ®20¯00<®20¯20 0:095¤
®20¯18 0.963 0.952 0.889 0.959 0.941 ®20¯00<®20¯18 0:016¤¤
®10¯20 0.958 0.919 0.905 0.881 0.984 0.929 ®10¯20<®20¯20 0.714
®20¯20 0.888 0.937 0.939 0.780 0.971 0.903 ®20¯18<®20¯20 0.833
®20¯40 0.973 0.962 0.943 0.949 0.957 ®20¯20<®20¯40 0:064¤
Change in Efﬁciency Induced: Last 20 Rounds-First 20 Rounds
Treatment Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5 Overall H1 p-value
®10¯00 0.024 0.045 0.126 0.256 0.113 ®10¯00<®20¯00 0.198
®20¯00 0.181 0.295 0.105 0.194 0.083 0.171 ®20¯00<®20¯20 0.333
®20¯18 0.323 0.286 0.111 0.173 0.223 ®20¯00<®20¯18 0.214
®10¯20 0.238 0.147 0.194 0.018 0.220 0.163 ®10¯20<®20¯20 0.397
®20¯20 0.204 0.188 0.173 0.177 0.212 0.191 ®20¯18<®20¯20 0.793
®20¯40 0.119 0.316 0.417 0.127 0.245 ®20¯20<®20¯40 0.222
Note: Signiﬁcant at: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level.
Table 6: Efﬁciency measure
45Model: sFP fEWA PA
Block: 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Discount Rate (r) Discount Rate (r)
®10¯00 1.0 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.1 0.0 0.9 1.0
®20¯00 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.0 0.2 0.1
®20¯18 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.2 1.0 0.3 0.2
®10¯20 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.3
®20¯20 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.2
®20¯40 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.1 1.0 0.4 0.3
Sensitivity (¸) Sensitivity (¸) Shock Interval (a)
®10¯00 1.5 4.4 4.5 2.8 1.6 4.5 4.4 3.7 500 500 250 50
®20¯00 1.5 4.3 14.0 18.0 1.7 4.0 5.1 7.4 50 100 150 50
®20¯18 1.6 8.0 11.5 18.3 1.5 5.3 6.2 9.5 50 300 500 150
®10¯20 1.9 5.9 8.6 13.8 1.8 4.7 6.2 8.2 100 500 450 300
®20¯20 2.8 5.6 8.1 11.2 2.4 3.8 6.1 6.7 200 300 350 350
®20¯40 3.4 6.5 14.0 20.5 3.2 4.9 6.7 9.9 150 50 150 50
Similarity Window (h)
®10¯00 1 1 10 9
®20¯00 10 10 9 6
®20¯18 5 4 6 1
®10¯20 1 1 8 3
®20¯20 2 2 7 1
®20¯40 1 3 2 2
Table 7: Calibration of Three Learning Models in Fifteen-Round Blocks
46Stochastic Fictitious Play
Session ®10¯00 ®20¯00 ®20¯18 ®10¯20 ®20¯20 ®20¯40
1 0.955 0.934 0.940 0.930 0.888 0.940
2 0.960 0.946 0.890 0.917 0.973 0.878
3 0.948 0.883 0.873
Overall 0.957 0.943 0.915 0.910 0.912 0.909
fEWA
1 0.956 0.934 0.942 0.928 0.887 0.948
2 0.960 0.946 0.890 0.922 0.978 0.886
3 0.946 0.879 0.871
Overall 0.958 0.942 0.916 0.910 0.912 0.917
Payoff Assessment
1 0.952 0.933 0.914 0.941 0.888 0.916
2 0.957 0.944 0.899 0.922 0.917 0.898
3 0.947 0.894 0.903
Overall 0.955 0.941 0.907 0.919 0.902 0.907
Equilibrium Play
1 1.867 1.853 1.833 1.833 1.489 1.792
2 1.889 1.919 1.606 1.839 1.953 1.669
3 1.917 1.447 1.539
Overall 1.878 1.896 1.719 1.706 1.660 1.731
Random Play
Overall 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976
Table 8: Validation on Hold-out Sessions
47Player 1 Equilibrium Price Player 2 Equilibrium Price
Treatment Probability H1 p-value Probability H1 p-value
®10¯00 0.073 0.082
®20¯00 0.188 ®20¯00>®10¯00 0.000*** 0.213 ®20¯00>®10¯00 0.000***
®20¯18 0.265 ®20¯18>®20¯40 0.187 0.381 ®20¯18>®10¯20 0.264
®10¯20 0.211 ®10¯20>®20¯00 0.000*** 0.376 ®10¯20>®20¯20 0.001***
®20¯20 0.243 ®20¯20>®10¯20 0.000*** 0.353 ®20¯20>®20¯00 0.000***
®20¯40 0.259 ®20¯40>®20¯20 0.007*** 0.442 ®20¯40>®20¯18 0.000***
Player 1 ²-Equilibrium Price Player 2 ²-Equilibrium Price
Treatment Probability H1 p-value Probability H1 p-value
®10¯00 0.216 0.232
®20¯00 0.519 ®20¯00>®10¯00 0.000*** 0.573 ®20¯00>®10¯00 0.000***
®20¯18 0.713 ®20¯18>®20¯40 0.045** 0.870 ®20¯18>®10¯20 0.008***
®10¯20 0.584 ®10¯20>®20¯00 0.000*** 0.857 ®10¯20>®20¯20 0.000***
®20¯20 0.662 ®20¯20>®10¯20 0.000*** 0.834 ®20¯20>®20¯00 0.000***
®20¯40 0.701 ®20¯40>®20¯20 0.000*** 0.925 ®20¯40>®20¯18 0.000***
Table 9: Results of t-tests comparing level of convergence of simulations of experimental treatments. Values
are for round 500 and based on 1500 simulated games.
Player1 Player 2
Threshold: 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
®20¯18 54 83 126 316 38 52 62 87 127 -
®10¯20 129 221 - - 36 48 63 91 148 -
®20¯20 61 91 149 - 39 51 61 84 137 -
®20¯40 101 166 263 496 30 38 56 94 166 339
Table 10: Speed of Convergence in Simulated Data: Threshold is the percent of players playing epsilon-
equilibrium strategy. Entry indicates round in which went over threshold for good, where “-” indicates that
treatment never achieved threshold.
48Treatment Efﬁciency H1 p-value
®10¯00 0.7804
®20¯00 0.9280 ®20¯00>®10¯00 0.000***
®20¯18 0.9831 ®20¯18>®10¯20 0.000***
®10¯20 0.9813 ®10¯20>®20¯20 0.003***
®20¯20 0.9800 ®20¯20>®20¯00 0.000***
®20¯40 0.9862 ®20¯40>®20¯18 0.000***
Table 11: Results of t-tests comparing efﬁciency in simulations of experimental treatments. Values are for
round 500 and based on 1500 simulated games.
49Model (1) (2)
























Log Likelihood -3243.55 -3178.81








H0 : ln(Round)D®10 = ln(Round)D¯00 = ln(Round)D¯18 = ln(Round)D¯40 =




Note: Signiﬁcant at: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Distribution of Announced Prices in Experimental Treatments: Player 2
































Figure 3: Distribution of ﬁrst round choices
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Figure 5: Simulated and actual ²-equilibrium play
55Simulated Efficiency Achieved:
























































































Figure 6: Efﬁciency in the simulated and actual data
56